Transition in Second Birth Intention in a Low Fertility Context: The Case of Jiangsu, China

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While China's national birth control policy has been widely referred as a one-child policy, it contains numerous categories of exemptions for allowing a second child since its introduction in 1979 (Gu et al. 2007). One of the exceptions is that if one or both of the married couples is/are an only child they are allowed for a second birth. After three decades of implementation of the one-child policy, a considerable number of couples qualify for the exception. Nonetheless, fertility in China continues its downward trend and TFR is currently estimated to be around 1.5 (Cai 2008; Guo 2009; Morgan, Guo and Hayford 2009). Some scholars suggest, however, that period TFR could underestimate the "true" fertility level in China, because of postponement of birth timing (Morgan et al 2009; Guo et al 2007). With the mean age of women at first birth to be around 23 years old, there is a long period left in the reproductive life span for Chinese women to achieve a second birth. For those women who are free to go forward with a second birth, they have tremendous flexibility in deciding whether and when to have another child. Therefore, we are interested in factors that could influence the woman's decision in one way or another.

Using panel data from a large-scale survey in Jiangsu province, characterized by its high economic development level and extremely low level of fertility (TFR close to 1), this paper sets its task to investigate the dynamics of women's intention for a second birth across a three-year interval. Instead of studying transition to a second birth, we focus our research lens on transition in second birth intention. We believe that this approach has considerable merit substantively and

methodologically. The fertility literature consistently demonstrated that childbearing intentions are the primary determinant of fertility (Barber 2001; Hayford 2009; see review in Morgan 2001). Since most Chinese women had the first birth quite early in their life course, those who qualify for a second birth still have an extended period of time left in their reproductive years. An evaluation of the transition to a second birth could still miss the tempo effect when many of them have yet to complete their fertility. Indeed, preliminary investigation of our study sample suggests that 95 percent of the women who qualify for a second birth did not experience a second birth during the three-year interval. In contrast, close to 40 percent of the women revised their intention for a second birth. We believe that these transitions could foreshadow changes in fertility behavior, leading to a better assessment of what could contribute to the delay or acceleration in fertility timing.

Existing studies have undoubtedly shown that fertility intentions change over time and interact with other domains of life experiences, such as education and employment (Hayford 2009). Although the one child-policy as well as preceding birth planning policies in the 1970s were believed to play an important role in China's rapid fertility decline, the overwhelming consensus among Chinese demographers is that socioeconomic development and human agency, rather than government intervention, is the main force that drives fertility decline and keeps fertility at the well below-replacement level in China (Gu 2008; Zheng et al. 2009; Cai 2010; Wang 2011). Taking a life course perspective, this paper also investigates how second birth intention changes along with other transitions in women's life circumstances in a three-year interval. In a country where dramatic social and economic changes have taken place and often deemed as the new land of opportunity, individual witness changes on a daily basis. Thus, women can experience fundamental changes that influence fertility intention as their lives

unfold, even in a relatively short period of time. The use of panel data will allow us to capture how changes in other life events/circumstances and their timing result in different changes in fertility intention. For example, a woman's fertility intention may decrease if she has experienced career advancement that is competing with childbearing (Morgan et al. 2009). On the other hand, a woman's likelihood for wanting a second child may increase if the family has experienced a sudden growth in economic and social resources during the three-year period.

In addition, we contribute to the literature on evolution of fertility intention by studying a full range of changes in fertility intention, including those who express uncertainty. Morgan (1981, 1982) forcefully argued that unlike birth, which is dichotomous, fertility intentions are inherently fluid in nature and "are couched in considerable uncertainty (1981:267)". Therefore, in research of fertility intention, uncertain intention should not be treated as "noise" in the data because it may foreshadow revisions of fertility intention and even changes of fertility behavior. Thus, instead of using a dichotomous construct we conceptualize the intention of having a second birth as a latent continuum of propensity. The uncertainty observed in the fertility intention arouses our interest in the question of the stability of fertility intention during a short period of three years. We would like to examine whether intention uncertainty imply a higher propensity of intention change, and whether the changes of fertility intention during the three-year period capture a postponement of the intention for a second birth.

Using data from the Jiangsu Fertility Intention and Behavior Study (JFIBS, 2007, 2010), we zero in our research lens on a sample of married women who only have one child at both survey time of 2007 and 2010 and were questioned on their intention to progress to a second one. We ask two main research questions. First, what factors propel women to be more inclined to intend for a second child and what factors pull them back? Second, to what extent do women's

fertility intention (for a second birth) change during a three-year period from 2007 to 2010 and how do the transitions in second birth intention respond to changes in other life domains? Specifically, what changes in life circumstance lead to a firmer intention for a second birth? Although it is unlikely to see fertility in China bouncing back to a high level even with a complete elimination of the one child policy, short-term rebounds are possible and thus making it crucial to understand what the changes of fertility intention along women's life span truly imply. As the possibility of a phase-out of the one-child policy looms large, the examination of changes of fertility intention in life trajectories is not a mere theoretical exercise but is of critical empirical importance and policy relevance. We begin with analysis of the determinants of second birth intention cross-sectionally in 2010, Then we longitudinally track the changes in women's second intention between 2007 and 2010. We expect the changes to include both upward revision and downward revision of intention. From observing transitions in fertility intention we expect to see postponement of intention for a second birth as some women in 2007 did not want to have a second child change their mind in 2010. Women may postpone second birth intention into later life stage until they feel ready to do so. The resources they have and their level of empowerment may all influence the decision. Moreover, women with uncertain intention in 2007 are more likely to alter their intention three years later. We further explore the determinants of transitions of such intention between 2007 and 2010, highlighting the influence of economic and family/social resources as well as of women's empowerment.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Resources and Fertility

The economic approach becomes one of the most influential frameworks in the study of fertility from the second half of the 1970s. Based on a simple intuitive micro-economic model, its fundamental propositions are that fertility is a result of conscious decision and deliberate purposeful action based on a couple's rational choice, and children are a special type of capital goods (Macunovich 1996). Rearing a child requires costs from both internal inputs from household member and external inputs purchased outside the household. Therefore household resources are important determinants of fertility. Based on China's social context, we differentiate two types of resources: economic resources and family/social resources.

Economic Resources and Fertility

Fertility is influenced by a couple's "relative affluence" (Easterlin 1976), which is a calculation of the difference between couple's resources and material aspirations. If their resources preponderate over aspiration, they are more willingly to have children. If they are short of resources compared to aspiration, they are less willing to have children. Easterlin (1976) suggests that resources could be measured by the male unemployment rate or the income of the male household head, while aspiration could be measured by the economic status of young adults' family of orientation, such as the income of their parents. In addition, the cost of childrearing can be relative low if the opportunity cost of wife's time could be offset by high earnings of the husband. In short, family earning, particularly male income is expected to have a positive effect on fertility. Economic resources can help the family to afford the growing expense

of raising children, to afford the fines on out-of-plan birth, and to reduce the opportunity cost of childbearing by gaining access to childcare services.

With regard to Chinese social context, studies suggest that at provincial level, places with higher level of social and economic development have lower fertility level (Cai 2010). At the individual level, people in the middle of the education distribution and the income distribution are less likely to intend to have a second birth (Zheng et al. 2009). However these findings are based on cross-sectional analysis. Little is known about how changes of women's economic resources influence them to alter fertility intention for a second child. Given the mean age of women at first birth in China is around 23 years old, a long period remains in Chinese women's reproductive life span for them to consider for a second child. What interests us is that what kind of life circumstances occurred in women's life course would make them change their mind about having an additional child. Taking a life course perspective, we contribute to the knowledge of transitions in second birth intention according to changes in life circumstances, particularly in economic resources. Our study also provides implications for the tempo effect in fertility and fertility postponement.

Family/Social Resources and Fertility

There is a substantial body of literature addressing the effects from parents on younger generation's fertility intention and behavior. One mechanism suggests that parental effect comes from parents' attitudes and preferences on fertility. Researches found that parental attitudes and preferences on fertility can either be transmitted to their children through early socialization in childhood and adolescence (Westoff and Potvin 1967) or directly and indirectly influence

children's fertility intention and behavior in their early adult life (Axinn, Clarkberg and Thornton 1994; Thornton 1980).

Another mechanism of parental influence on fertility emphasizes the effect of family/household structure. It has been theorized that the extended family structure has a pronatal effect on the younger generation. In pre-industrialized societies, fertility is a method to achieve the continuity of family lineage, therefore coresident parents may motivate children to have a large family and children may be motivated in order to conform to the social norm and solidify their standing in the family (Davis 1955; Davis and Blake 1956; Goode 1970). Besides that, extended family structure provides potential sources for childcare and shares the economic costs and burden of children, thus leads to higher fertility (Chen et al. 2011).

Extended family structure still persists in a certain extent in Contemporary Chinese society. A considerable proportion of elderly parents still live with their adult children (Chen et al. 2011). In addition, no matter whether the old generation co-resides with the younger generation or not, intergenerational exchange and support remains at a high level (Chen et al. 2011). Grandparents are found to be an important source to provide childcare for their children (Chen, Short and Entwisle 2000). In such a social context, research found that parental influences have a significant pro-natal effect on Chinese women's fertility intention (Chen et al. 2011). It is known that employed women are often discouraged from having more children because of the high opportunity cost, but parental and in-laws' support in the unique Chinese social context, by reducing the opportunity costs, may make it possible for employed women to do both: to have a couple of kids and also to maintain a career.

The Empowerment of Women and Fertility Decline

In pre-transition patriarchal society, gender inequalities limit women's access to wealth and income and reduce their economic bargaining power, thus making it easier for husbands and his family to impose their fertility preference on wives (Folbre 1983). However, during the social and the fertility transition, women become more empowered. The empowerment of women has been described as increased women's educational levels, more access to satisfying jobs, much lightened domestic responsibilities, and much higher status in the family and community than before (McIntosh and Finkle 1995). Changing gender and family systems grant women freedom of movement, encourage their education or familiarity with the world outside the home, and give them control over material resources. All these make it easier for women to learn about, get access to, and come to view as safe and morally acceptable the means to limit childbearing within marriage (Mason 1993; Mason 2001). The shift from the emphasis on a father-son tie in extended family to the increasing importance of a more equal conjugal tie in nuclear family provides women more autonomy in fertility decision. Researches argue when gender equity increases and women become more empowered, women opt to have fewer children and fertility declines (McIntosh and Finkle 1995; McDonald 2000).

Another socio-economic mechanism explaining the relationship between the empowerment of women and fertility decline is the effect of employment on childbearing. Low fertility is mainly a response to competing demands. Many women respond to the incongruity between work and family demands by postponing childbearing and subsequently forgoing additional births. It has been observed that "the stronger the role incompatibility between female labor force participation and childrearing, the lower the expected level of fertility" (Rindfuss, Brewster, and Kavee 1996:478). First, researches point out that since more married women enter the formal

labor force and increased female education raises the wages that they can command, the opportunity costs associated with each child increases (Willis 1973; Lindert 1978; Turchi 1975). These costs include forgone wages while out of the labor force, along with the loss of skill development that can reduce wage rates upon reentry. As a result, the greater the potential loss of earnings, the less likely a woman would be to have additional children (Becker 1981; Cigno 1991; Ermisch 1996). This argument is well supported at the individual level (Jejeebhoy 1995). However some scholar argues that opportunity costs are only one possible factor in this inverse relation between female education and fertility (Cochrane 1979; Jejeebhoy 1995). Because in underdeveloped rural areas with few opportunities for women to engage in paid work, the inverse association between female schooling and fertility does not reflect educational variation in opportunity costs (e.g. Sathar and Mason 1993). Second, occupational category and associated earning power also influence fertility. Researchers find that lower-skill occupations women had first births earlier and medium- and higher-skill occupations women had first births later (Rendall et al. 2009). Increasing postponement of first births further leads to the possibility of lower completed fertility and unrealized desired family sizes. Third, researches point out that there is a conflict between time devoted to employment and time devoted to childbearing (Joshi 2002). The stress of work and potential inadequate day care for children may reduce working mother's fertility intention. Competing demands make women who value their involvement in individual-oriented institutions face with a dilemma if they perceive a potential future family role as inconsistent with their aspirations as individuals. Researchers point out that the stronger the role incompatibility between female labor force participation and childrearing, the lower the expected level of fertility would be (Torr and Short 2004). Because some women in this circumstance may opt to eschew the family role rather than the individual role, that is, they will

postpone childbearing (Torr and Short 2004) or intend to have no children or fewer children (McDonald 2000a).

China's social and economic development makes contemporary Chinese women more empowered than before. More women attend formal schooling and more of them achieve junior high school or higher education than before (Hannum, Park and Cheng 2007). More rural women enter off-farm work force (see review in Bian 2002). The growing proportion of employed women makes more women face the competing demands between work and childbearing. And women's economic autonomy may offer her more bargaining power in fertility decision-making and leave them more uncertain about future birth. On one hand it could be expected that it is also true in China that with higher level of empowerment women are less likely to want to have an additional children. On the other hand, however, the effect of empowerment on fertility intention could be conditional on what their "true" fertility desire is. For example, for women are only child themselves and desire more than one child, empowerment may, exerting the opposite effect, enable these women to have a second child. Researches found that it is many people's perception that one of the handicaps of being the only child is having lonely childhood (Thompson 1974; Blake 1981). Hence, for women are only child themselves, they are more likely to experience loneliness in their childhood or other negative consequences of being the only child. Thus, it could be reasonable that these women are more likely to want their child to have brothers/sisters as accompany. Consequently, empowerment may not decrease the second birth intention for women who are only child themselves, rather for these women having being empowered make them more able to intend for a second child. So far, very few studies of fertility intention in China have taken into account the effect of empowerment. Our work contributes significantly to existing literature in this area by creating an informative measure of

women's empowerment and examining how empowerment shapes women's second birth intention.

RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

The brief review of literature in preceding section suggests two forces influencing women's second birth intention in two opposite directions. Pro-natal economic and family/social resources push women forward to have more than one child, while effects of empowerment pull them back from having a second birth. These two forces are acting on women in contemporary Chinese society together. Therefore we would like to know if these two forces have been taken into account at the same time in our analysis, what would be the picture of second birth intention for Chinese women. On one hand we expect that pronatal resources push the women become more likely to want to have two children. Thus, we hypothesize:

Hypothesis 1a: Women with more economic resources are more likely to state a fertility intention inclining to have a second child.

Hypothesis 1b: Women with more family/social resources have higher inclination to state a second birth intention.

On the other hand women's empowerment can decrease their fertility intention to remaining in parity one by both increasing the opportunity cost and women's bargaining power in fertility decision-making. The general definition of empowerment includes increase in women's education levels, access to satisfying jobs, and status in the family and community (McIntosh and Finkle 1995). In this analysis we will focus on women's decision-making power within the family. Hence, we hypothesize:

Hypothesis 2a: More empowered women are less inclined to intend for one more child, rather they are more likely to state that having one child is enough.

In addition, however, the effect of empowerment on fertility intention can be conditional on women's sibling size from family of origin. Since we expect that women who are only child themselves are more likely to want their children to have accompany and empowerment enable them to intend so, we hypothesize:

Hypothesis 2b: for women without siblings empowerment increases their fertility intention to be more inclined to give a second birth. But for women with siblings, empowerment decreases their second birth intention.

Finally, we anticipate that fertility intention change over time. Women may alter their intention for a second child according to changes happened in their life circumstance. We focus our analysis on the effect of changing family income, as an important component of changing economic resources, on intention transition for two reasons. On one hand, we expect substantive changes of family income during the three-year interval. Jiangsu is an economically advanced province with a high growth rate of GDP per capita. Support from both national policies and foreign investment build the basis for its booming economic environment. The opportunities for a family to become affluent are as many as the risks for a family to experience a downturn of its economic wellbeing. Therefore, three year could be an adequate window for us to observe ample transitions of family economic resources and family income per capita is one of the most straightforward indicators. On the other hand, the family/social resources and the level of empowerment of a woman could be relatively stable for a three-year interval. Especially the extent of women empowerment in the family is mainly decided by women's education level and the difference in education between the wife and the husband. Since most people finish their

education in early twenties, we do not expect the level of women empowerment will change too much in three years. Therefore, taking a life course perspective we hypothesize:

Hypothesis 3: increased family income per capita could propel the women to revise their intention for second birth in an upward direction.

DATA AND MEASUREMENT

Data

This study uses data from Jiangsu Fertility Intention and Behavior Study (JFIBS). JFIBS is a longitudinal study started from 2007 and collected its data for the second wave in 2010. JFIBS interviews women about their fertility intention and childbearing behavior in Jiangsu province in China. 18,638 women aged between 18 and 40, from 47 communities within six counties have been interviewed in the first wave. The survey is based on a two-stage clustered sampling method. First, rural village or urban neighborhood is randomly selected as the primary sampling unit. Second, age-eligible women are randomly selected for a face-to-race interview on a standardized questionnaire. For this study we further restrict the sample to women who are in their first marriage and have only one child at the survey time of both 2007 and 2010 (n=10,632). There are only 234 women who had one child in 2007 and gave birth to a second child during the three-year interval. These women's fertility behavior may have also been influenced by various changes happened in their life domain during the three-year interval as those who altered their fertility intention. We did a sensitive test by comparing the regression results between the sample including these women and the sample excluding them. Because the results turned out to be very similar, we only present the results excluding those women who had a second birth since 2007.

Jiangsu is an economically advanced province located in the east coast of China, besides Shanghai. Its GDP is second high among all provinces in China in 2010. Although Jiangsu has a high population density, its fertility rate reaches the below-replacement level with a TFR of 1.17 in China's 1% Population Survey of 2005 (Chen et al. 2011). The low fertility level is partially due to a restrictive province-wide one-child policy that has been implemented for the past three decades (Gu et al. 2007). In our sample, 24% of the women are allowed to have two children, mostly as a result of both the spouse and herself being only child themselves. Besides, continuous socioeconomic development also contributes to the low fertility rate (Cai 2010; Zheng et al. 2009). In a place with fast economic growth, many people in the young generation has prioritized economic opportunities and developing one's career over rearing more children. Due to the high opportunity cost of rearing children many women postpone childbearing into later life stage.

Dependent Variable

We use two dependent variables in the analysis. The first one measures intention for a second birth in 2010. In both 2007 and 2010 for married women with one child, a question is asked as "Do you plan to have another child if policy permit?" The answers are "definitely no more", "maybe no more", "not certain", "maybe one more", and "definitely one more" [1]. Figure

[1] We tried to simplify this dependent variable into three categories, keeping "definitely no more" as the reference category, combining "maybe no more" and "not certain" into the category of "inclined to no more", and combining "maybe one more" and "definitely one more" into the category of "inclined to one more". The regression results for the lagged model without interaction effect remain similar to the model using the 5-category dependent variable. But when adding the interaction of decision-making index and women's sibling size, the simplified dependent variable is not detailed enough to catch the interaction effect. As a result, we decide to use the full range of the answers for second birth intention in our descriptive analysis and in the analysis for the determinants of second birth intention in 2010.

1 presents the distribution of fertility intention for second birth in 2007 and in 2010. For both years, over 70% of the women state a firm intention for no more child. One child is still a norm accepted by the majority of women. Around 22% to 25% of the women are not sure about whether they want to proceed to parity two. Only 2% of them are very certain about having one more child. From 2007 to 2010 there is a 3% decrease in women who certainly do not want an additional child, while there is a 4% increase in women who state that they may want to have a second child. These changes may suggest that women postpone second birth intention until later life stage or some transition in life circumstances make them change their mind. We will address this argument in further detail in the results part.

- Figure 1 about here -

Our second dependent variable measures changes in second birth intention between 2007 and 2010. In investigating transitions of second birth intention, we begin with a simple cross tabulation of second birth intention in 2007 and 2010. In Table 1, on the diagonal are women whose fertility intention remains the same over time; the area below consists of women who downwardly altered their intention; the area above represents women who upwardly revised their intention. We observe a striking amount of change in women's fertility intention in the three-year interval. On one hand, fertility intention of a considerable number of women decreases. For women who intended to have more than one child in 2007, no matter how certain they were, the majority of them shifted their intention downwardly to definitely want no more children in 2010. On the other hand however, many women who did not express an interest in a second birth in the first wave changed their mind three year later. 10.41 percent of women whose intention is

"definitely no more", 19.52 percent of women whose intention is "maybe no more", and 22.37 percent of women whose intention is "not certain" in 2007 altered their intention upwardly to either "maybe one more" or "definitely one more" in 2010. Similarly, 7.56 percent of women whose intention showed a tendency toward a second birth in 2007 (the "maybe one more" category) state a firm intention for a second child in 2010. These results do provide evidence for the tempo effect on fertility intention implying women may postpone intention for a second child at later stage of their lives. Also interestingly, women with uncertain fertility intention are more inclined to change than women whose fertility intention were more certain. Only 8.64 percent of women who are uncertain about the second birth remain so in 2010. The majority of them either changed their mind into having just one child or having one more. In contrast, for women who definitely want no more children in 2007, 77.44 percent remain so in 2010.

- Table 1 about here -

To capture these changes in second birth intention, we code our second dependent variable about intention transition in five categories: largely decreased=1, slightly decreased=2, unchanged=3, slightly increased=4, and largely increased=5, in which unchanged is the reference category. Table 2 describes how each category of change is defined[1]. Figure 2 presents the distribution of intention transition over the three-year interval. Although 63% of the women do

[1] We tried to simplify this dependent variable by coding it into three categories: combining the unchanged, the slightly decreased and the slightly increased together to make the reference category of the slightly changed or unchanged, and letting the largely decreased and the largely increased to be the other two categories. However regression results show that the simplified dependent variable is not detailed enough to catch the effect of changes of family income on intention transition. Therefore we decide to use the full range of intention transitions (five categories) as our dependent variable.

not change their fertility intention after three years, close to 40% of them do shift their intention, which is quite considerable. 16% of the women downwardly revised their fertility intention, while 21% of them experienced an increase in their intention.

- Table 2 about here -

- Figure 2 about here -

Independent Variables

Based on the theoretical framework and the structure of our hypotheses we have three sets of independent variables. They measure women's economic resources, family/social resources, and the level of empowerment.

Economic resources. The indicators include women's education, occupation, family income per capita, the change of family income per capita from 2007 to 2010, and *Hukou* status (household registration status). Women's education is measured by four categories, with no education or elementary education = 1, middle school = 2, high school = 3, some collage and above = 4. Women's occupation is operationalized in five categories, where no job = 1, agriculture = 2, manufacture = 3, low-skilled service = 4, and high- skilled service =5. Family income is recoded by quartile, where family income locates in the lowest 25 percent is recoded into 1, and family income locates in the highest 25 percent is recoded into 4. The change of family income per capita is recoded into two categories, with not largely increased = 0 and largely increased = 1. Table 2 shows in detail that how we define large increase in family income. Women's *Hukou* type is a binary variable, where other *Hukous (*including Urban *Hukou)* = 0 and rural *Hukou* = 1. Descriptive statistics for independent variables concerning

economic resources show that the majority of women in our sample attained middle school education. Nearly half of them work in manufacturing jobs in 2010. In 2010, the gap of average family income per capita between the highest and the lowest quartile is around 18,000 RMB (2,900 USD). Around 10 percent of the families experienced a large increase in their family income per capita during the three-year interval. In our sample, around 60 percent of the women have rural Hukou (See Table 3).

Family/Social resources. Childcare availability is an important factor when it comes to fertility decision making, particularly in China, where female labor force participation is among the highest in the world (World Bank 2010). The factors include living arrangement and perceived or observed parental help on childcare. Living arrangements with parents or parents-in-law is measure by whether the woman is coresident with either of them, where non-corisedence = 0, coresidence =1. Parents and parents-in-law's willingness for or actual help with childcare is also measure by two categories, where no help = 0, willing to help or actually helped = 1. Coresident is still a prevalent form of living arrangement in China. Over half of the women in our sample are coresident with their parents or parents-in-law in 2010. 35.9% of the women have ever received parental or in-laws' help on childcare before 2010 (See Table 3).

Women's Empowerment. Women's empowerment is measured by their decision-making power in the family. We create a decision-making index to measure women's decision-making power. 8 items of family routines were listed in the questionnaire and women were asked how decisions are made about each of these items. The items include: (1) daily expenditure of the family; (2) the purchase of expansive goods; (3) the purchase of large agricultural implement; (4) fertility; (5) children's education/employment; (6) the purchase house; (7) decision of agricultural activity/production; (8) investment or loan. For each item, if wife usually makes the

final decision or if the couple discuss together and then wife makes the final decision, we add one score to the index. Therefore, the decision-making index of wife making the final decision is measured on a 0-8 scale. Descriptive analysis shows that the average score of the index is 0.893, meaning that on average women can make final decision about less than one of the eight issues of family routines (See Table 3). We also tried to measure the level of empowerment by women's individual income or women's contribution to household income, but no effect is observed from these two variables. In contrast, the decision-making index is very robust across all models even after control variables are added.

Controls

We control for women's age, migration experience, policy eligibility for a second birth, gender of the first child, age of the first child, wife's sibling size and husband's sibling size. Due to the problems of high collinearity with other independent and control variables, women's age at marriage is dropped from the model. The average age of women in the 2007 interview is 34-year-old. In our sample around 28% of the women have migration experience. Only 24% of them are allowed for 2 kids by the policy. Among the first child of the women, 47% are girl. The average age of the first child in 2007 is around 9-year-old. The majority of our respondents and their husbands are not only child themselves. Around 85% of the women and 81% of the husbands have siblings (See Table 3).

- Table 3 about here -

METHODS

In the multivariate analysis, we first use multinomial logistic regression with lagged variable to model women's second birth intention in 2010. In this lagged variable analysis, we pool the 2007 and 2010 waves of the JFIBS data together and model women's fertility intention in 2010 as an outcome of their fertility intention in 2007 and their economic resources, family/social resources, and level of empowerment measured in 2010. The approach is illustrated by the following equation of Model I:

$$\log\left(\frac{Pr(W_{it}=k)}{Pr(W_{it}=l)}\right) = \beta_1 W_{it-1} + \beta_2 R_{it} + \beta_3 F_{it} + \beta_4 E_{it-1} + \beta_5 I_{it} + r_i \qquad (1)$$

The dependent variable is the log-odds that a woman *i* stated fertility intention *k* versus fertility intention *l* at time *t* (2010). Since the fertility intention has five categories, the model is a multinomial logistic regression with "definitely no more" as the reference category. W stands for women *i*'s fertility intention at time *t-1* (2007), *R* for economic resources, *F* for family/social resources, *E* for level of empowerment, *I* for some individual, child, and husband attributes in control, and *r* for effect from unobserved variables. For measures of empowerment we use information from 2007 wave because questions concerning empowerment are only interviewed in this wave.

Second, we add an interaction effect between women's level of empowerment and their sibling size to Model I. Model II with the interaction effect is illustrated by the following equation:

$$\log\left(\frac{Pr(W_{it}=k)}{Pr(W_{it}=l)}\right) = \beta_1 W_{it-1} + \beta_2 R_{it} + \beta_3 F_{it} + \beta_4 E_{it-1} + \beta_5 I_{it} + \beta_6 E_{it-1} * S_{it} + r_i \qquad (2)$$

S, as a binary variable, stands for whether the women have any siblings. It is controlled as one of the individual attributes (*I*) in Model I. $E_{it-1} * S_{it}$ stands for the interaction effect.

Finally, we model the transition of women's fertility intention between 2007 and 2010 by a change score analysis with multinomial logistic regression model. The effect of changing family income on transition of women's second birth intention is illustrated by the following equation:

$$logit\ (\Delta Y_i) = \beta_1 \Delta R_i + \beta_2 I_{it-1} + r_i \qquad (3)$$

In Model III, the dependent variable is the change of second birth intention between 2007 and 2010. ΔR_i stands for changes in family income per capita for women *i* between 2007 and 2010. *I* stands for some individual and child attributes in control. These control variables are measured in 2007, including women's education, *Hukou* status, age, and migration experience, as well as policy eligibility for second child, the gender and age of the first child.

We consider that women's intention for a second birth may largely depend on how much time later this question is asked from the birth of the first child, so we tried different ways of controlling for the age of the first child. In one way we use the full sample and ran through Model I to Model III putting the variable of the first child's age in control. In the other way we tried to limit our sample to women whose first child is under school age (6-year-old) (sample II) and ran through Model I to Model III. We also tried to limit our sample to women whose first child is under 10 (sample III) and did the same analysis. The results of sample II is not as good as what we have for the full sample, but the results of sample III is similar to or a little bit better than that of the full sample because the size of all significant coefficients increase. But since we want to be as inclusive as we can, we finally decide to use the full sample and controlling for the age of the first child in the models.

RESULTS

Results from multivariate analyses indicate that economic resources, family and social resources, and the extent of women's empowerment all contribute to shape women's second birth intention. We find that women are more likely to state a concern for having one more child when they are more educated; have relatively higher family income; are registered with rural *Hukou* or work in agricultural sector; and have parental help on child care. We also find that women are less inclined to have a second child when they are more empowered in the family. But this effect is conditioned on women's sibling size from the family of origin. In addition, we find that the transition of women's fertility intention is influenced by the changes of their economic resources in that period of time. Large increase in family income has a pronatal effect of shifting women's fertility intention toward two children. We elaborate these findings in detail in the following three sections.

The Effect of Resources and Empowerment on Second Birth Intention

Results from the multinomial logit regression are presented in Table 4. In the following explanations of Table 4, we mainly focus on the contrast between the category of "maybe one more" versus "definitely no more". But we also discuss the significant effects found in contrasts between other categories of the dependent variable versus the "definitely no more" category. The effect of economic resources on second birth intention is consistent across the two key measures of economic resources: education and family income. Sufficient economic resources have a pronatal effect on second birth intention (See Model I in Table 4). First, consistent with hypothesis 1a, we find that compared to women with no or elementary education, women on every higher education level are more likely to state that they may want to have one more child

than to express a firm willingness to stay in parity one. Compared to women with no or elementary education, women with education of some college and above are also more likely to have a less firm intention for only one child by stating that they may, but not definitely, want no more child. Besides, compared to women in the lowest family income quartile, women in any quartile higher are more likely to have an intention for "maybe one more child" rather than to intend firmly for only one child. Compared to women in the lowest family income quartile, women in the highest quartile are also more likely to state a less firm intention for only one child or to state a firm intention for two children rather than saying that they definitely want to remain in parity one. In addition, compared women with other Hukou (e.g. urban Hukou), women with rural Hukou are more likely to state that they definitely want no more child than to intend that maybe they do not want an additional child. There are several plausible explanations for the positive relationship between economic resources and intention for the second birth. Since there is a policy constraint on the number of children a family could have, the quality of child has been overemphasized in current Chinese families and as a consequence, the price of childrearing keeps increasing. Only family with sufficient income can afford the economic resources that two children demand. Women's income is associated with their education level. Since dual-earner family is the most prevalent form of family division of labor in China, highly educated women or women with urban Hukou are more able to contribute to family income and provide economic resources for more than one child. Another explanation takes into account the contribution of men. It is argued that the child price would be decreased if the opportunity cost of wife's time could be offset by high income from the husband (Easterlin 1976). Therefore, high family income, either from wife or husband, helps the family to afford the growing expense of raising additional children and the penalty on out-of-plan birth.

Second, in contrast however, we also find that relative to women with other Hukou (e.g. urban Hukou), women with rural Hukou are less inclined to just have one kid but more likely to stay in the "maybe one more" category. Moreover, compared to women with no job, those who work in agriculture sector are more likely to intend for having two children than just one, because they are more likely to be in the "maybe no more", the "uncertain", or the "maybe one more" category than in the "definitely no more" category. Although we expect that women with rural Hukou will have less economic resources thus want to have fewer children, the unique social context in rural China can explain why rural women may also have higher fertility intention than urban women. With increasing social mobility in contemporary Chinese society Hukou status is no longer a strong indicator for resident place, but still have important implication for one's family of origin and associated value system. Women with rural Hukou or work in agricultural sector often have their family of origin in rural places and have a relative strong value for having more kids. In rural places the number of children, especially of male children, is important for agricultural production and economic advancement of the family. Since child value is relatively high and child price is relatively low, the pronatal value for children is much stronger in rural area than in urban places. Additionally, the opportunity cost of rural women is relatively lower than that of urban women because rural women's income is generally lower and they can find helpers from the family to take over their work on farm. As a result, women with rural Hukou or working in agricultural sector are more likely to intend for a second birth than women with urban Hukou or without job.

Our hypothesis 1b about the pronatal effect of family/social resources on fertility intention is partially support by the results (See Model I in Table 4). We find that relative to women with no parental or in-laws' help on child care, women with such help are less likely to

fall into the category of definitely want no more but more likely to at least keep the door open by stating that they may want no more child, though still not for sure. If parents or parents-in-law ever helped with child care, for women this means that there will be a potential parental help if they give another birth. Parental help on child care has a pronatal effect because it helps to avoid the opportunity cost of women's time and also helps to resolve the conflicting demand between work and raising children.

Moreover, we find that consistent with hypothesis 2a women have higher score in the decision-making index of final decision made by wife are less likely to state that they may want to have one more child, instead they are more likely to firmly intend that they only want to have one child (See Model I in Table 4). As is theorized in the foregoing section, women are more empowered if they could make the final decision for a larger number of items concerning family routines. The phenomenon that more empowered woman has less intention for a second birth is probably a response to incongruous roles of career woman and a caregiver for children. Given the high female labor force participation rate in China, numerous women in contemporary society experience competing demand from work and child care, but only those who are more empowered in the family are more able to give priority to their individual aspiration for work rather than to the familial aspiration for an additional child. In addition, the opportunity cost associate with each child could be higher for more educated and empowered women. Besides, the earnings of a woman who are more empowered could also be more important to the family than that of a less empowered woman. As a result, the potential loss of earnings associated with childrearing could be much higher for more empowered women and her family. Therefore these women are much less inclined to give birth to a second child.

More interestingly we find an interaction effect between the decision-making power and the women's sibling size on their second birth intention, which is consistent with our hypothesis 2b (see Model II in Table 4). Figure 3 shows the predicted probabilities of the "maybe one more" vs. "definitely no more" comparison, conditioning on women's score on decision-making index and whether they have siblings. Depicted by Figure 3, the interaction effect suggests that the effect of decision-making power is conditioned on whether the women are only child themselves. The main effect of empowerment in Model I suggests that empowerment decreases women's fertility intention for a second child. The interaction effect shows that this is still true for women with at least one sibling. For these women, higher decision-making power makes them want to have fewer children. However, for the women with no sibling, higher decision-making power makes them want to have more children. If we do not take into account the extent of empowerment, women with no sibling are, in general, less likely to intend to have two children than women with siblings. But after considering the effect of empowerment, we observe that the likelihood of intending to have one more child for women with no sibling increases according to their decision-making power in the family. When the score on the decision-making index reaches 3 or higher, women with no sibling become even more likely to want to have one more child than women with siblings. So we conclude that for women who are only child themselves they are more likely to want more children but only if they have enough power to do so.

- Table 4 about here -

- Figure 3 about here -

The Effect of Changing Economic Resources on Transitions of Second Birth Intention

Table 5 presents the results of the analysis regarding to how changing economic resources influence the change of second birth intention. Our explanations mainly focus on the contrast between women whose intention largely increased versus whose intention unchanged during the three-year interval.

Results of Model III in Table 5 are consistent with our hypothesis 3 that increased family income per capita, as an important part of changing economic resources, during the three-year interval propel the women to upwardly revise their second birth intention. It is found that compared to women whose family income decreased, unchanged, or slightly increased, if there was a large increase in family income (about 2-3 quartiles) between 2007 and 2010, women's fertility intention for second birth in 2010 are more likely to be largely increased and become 2 to 4 categories higher than that in 2007 rather than remain unchanged. Two points need to be noticed. First, such a pronatal effect can be observed only if the extent of increase in economic resources is large enough. Also, the consequent increase of second birth intention is considerable. in other words, if we view the 5-category measurement of second birth intention in a ordered form, the extent of intention increase due to increased family income takes two to four categories. Figure 4 presents the predicted probabilities of intention transition that is conditioned on whether there is a large increase in family income. Figure 4 clearly depicts the pronatal effect of large family income increase on the transition of fertility intention. In the fourth pair of comparison, compared to those who did not experience a large increase in family income in three years, women with family income largely increased are significantly more likely to shift their second birth intention in an upward direction and for a considerable scale. This finding has an important implication for the tempo effect on fertility intention. The intentions for a second birth,

which did not exist in 2007, may emerge in 2010 because women experience a large increase in their family income. In other words, women may postpone their second birth intention until there is an accumulation of sufficient economic resources for them to afford the expense for a second child and the associated opportunity cost.

- Table 5 about here -

- Figure 4 about here -

CONCLUSION

Since the mean age of women at first birth is around 23 years old in China, for women who are qualified for two children, a large window is open for them to achieve a second birth in later phase of reproductive life span. Therefore, to what extent do women want to have an additional child, and how have the second birth intention been influenced by transition in life circumstance and thus change over time become interesting and important questions. Although one child still remains the fertility norm for women in their reproductive age, we observe a quarter of women in our sample keep their door open for a second birth. Besides, second birth intentions can be quite fluid. From 2007 to 2010 close to 40% of women in the survey either downwardly or upwardly changed their second birth intention in a rather short period of time. Our study goes on with analyzing the influential factors that shape women's second birth intention in 2010 controlling for their intention in 2007. We find that more economic resources are associated with higher inclination to a second birth intention. But the effects of family/social resources on second birth intention are ambivalent, with parental or in-laws' help exerting a pro-natal effect on second birth intention while coresidence with parents or parents-in-law has an

opposite effect. We also find more empowered women with higher decision-making power in family are less inclined to have an intention for a second birth. But this effect of empowerment is conditional on whether the women are only child themselves. For women with no siblings, empowerment makes them want more children while enable them to do so. We then proceed to model how women revise their second birth intention according to changing economic resources during the three-year interval. Our results show that women may shift their intention in a large extent toward having a second birth if there was a considerable increase in family income per capita.

At the same time, we acknowledge the data limitation. There are only two waves of data available and the duration between them are relatively short. Three years is a rather small window for changes to occur in both women's second birth intention and life experience. Multiple waves of data covering a longer period of time in women's life course would help us to design the study better. In addition, the data for our study is not nationally representative sample. Therefore we should be very cautious about generalizing our results to other places in China, which may have different economic environment, social context, and policy restriction.

The transitions in second birth intention discussed in the analysis have important implications in the long run. For women in current reproductive cohort, regardless of their intention for additional child or how they shift their intention, a small percentage of them actually achieve the second birth. We consider in a transitional society that undergoes fast economic development the tradeoff between opportunity cost and childbearing could be especially high. Consequently, the real fertility intention for this generation in transition could be suppressed and consistent below-replacement level fertility could be observed. What we find that fertility intention could shift from intending for no more child toward desiring for two children

when large increase in economic resources occurs leads us to notice that there are indeed life course transitions that could have a strong pronatal effect. For these women with large advancement in economic resources, if this change had happened earlier or if we keep tracking them, to what extent could the shift toward higher intention for second birth push them to really achieve it? The findings also encourage us to consider the implication of transitions in second birth intention in a broader picture across generations. As we know that suppressed second birth intention rebounds when large increase in economic resources occur to offset the opportunity cost of childrearing. And since demographers consistently demonstrated that fertility intentions are the primary predictors of childbearing behavior (Barber 2001; Hayford 2009; see review in Morgan 2001), for future Chinese generations who will live in a much more developed and affluent society will the intention for second birth become a new norm along with accumulation of wealth in individual household? And as the possibility of a phase-out of the one-child policy looms large, may the increase in second birth intention truly imply a raise of the total fertility rate in China? To answer these questions, longitudinal and cohort studies examining how both fertility intention and behavior change over time are tasks set for future.

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Figure 1. Fertility Intention for Second Birth in 2007 and 2010 (in Percentage, N=10,632)



Table 1. Changes in Women's Fertility Intention from 2007 to 2010 (N=10,632)

2007 Fertility Intention		2010 Fertility Intention (Row %)						
		Definitely No More (1)	Maybe No More (2)	Not Certain (3)	Maybe One More (4)	Definitely One More (5)	Total	N
Definitely No More	(1)	77.44	8.02	4.13	9.29	1.12	100.00	8,042
Maybe No More	(2)	64.34	12.17	3.98	16.27	3.25	100.00	830
Not Certain	(3)	59.49	9.49	8.64	18.98	3.39	100.00	590
Maybe One More	(4)	49.33	11.56	5.00	26.56	7.56	100.00	900
Definitely One More	(5)	48.89	9.26	4.81	21.11	15.93	100.00	270
Total		72.32	8.76	4.46	12.13	2.33	100.00	10,632

Table 2. Recode for Variables of Transition

Original Differences	Variable in the Model
Difference between 2010 and 2007 fertility intention	***Transitions of Fertility Intention from 2007 to 2010***
2010 intention is 2-4 scales lower than 2007 intention	Largely Decreased
2010 intention is 1 scale lower than 2007 intention	Slightly Decreased
2010 intention is the same as 2007 intention	Unchanged *(Ref. Cat.)*
2010 intention is 1 scale higher than 2007 intention	Slightly Increased
2010 intention is 2-4 scales higher than 2007 intention	Largely Increased
Difference between 2010 and 2007 family income (per capita)	***The Change of Family Income (per capita) from 2007 to 2010***
Largely decreased by 3 quartile	Not Largely Increased *(Ref. Cat.)*
Largely decreased by 2 quartile	
Slightly decreased by 1 quartile	
Unchanged	
Slightly increased by 1 quartile	
Largely increased by 2 quartile	Largely Increased
Largely increased by 3 quartile	

Figure 2. Transitions of Fertility Intention from 2007 to 2010 (in Percentage, N=10,632)



Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Independent and Control Variables (N=10,632)

	2007		2010	
Variables	**Mean**	**SD**	**Mean**	**SD**
Economic Resources				
Education				
Middle School	0.604	0.489	0.595	0.491
High School	0.178	0.382	0.193	0.395
Some College and above	0.096	0.294	0.111	0.314
No Educ and Elementary School *(Ref. Cat.)*	0.123	0.328	0.100	0.300
Occupation				
Agriculture	--	--	0.108	0.310
Manufacture	--	--	0.472	0.499
Low-skilled Service	--	--	0.166	0.372
High-skilled Service	--	--	0.168	0.374
No Job *(Ref. Cat.)*	--	--	0.085	0.280
Avg. Family Income (per capita)				
2nd Quartile	--	--	8862.184	924.771
3rd Quartile	--	--	11938.193	1039.882
4th Quartile (highest)	--	--	23516.679	20223.261
1st Quartile (lowest) *(Ref. Cat.)*	--	--	5484.941	1328.245
The Change of Family Income (per capita) from 2007 to 2010				
Largely Increased (Yes=1, No=0)	--	--	0.104	0.305
Hukou Status				
Rural *Hukou* (Yes=1, No (Including Urban *Hukou*)=0)	0.604	0.489	0.628	0.483
Family/Social Resources				
Living Arrangement with Parents/Parents-in-law				
Coresident (Yes=1, No=0)	--	--	0.523	0.500
Parental Help on Child Care				
Has Parental Help (Yes=1, No=0)	--	--	0.359	0.480
Empowerment				
Avg. Decision-Making Index: Final Decision by Wife (0-8)	0.893	1.190	--	--
Control Variables				
Avg. Women's Age	34.044	5.007	37.044	5.007
Migration Experience befor the Survey Year				
Has Migration Experience (Yes=1, No=0)	0.283	0.450	0.277	0.447
Policy Eligibility for Second Birth				
Allowed for 2 Kids (Yes=1, No=0)	0.237	0.425	--	--
Gender of the First Child				
Girl (Yes=1, No=0)	0.472	0.499	--	--
Avg. Age of the First Child	9.510	5.281	12.510	5.281
No. of Siblings on Wife's Side				
>=1 (Yes=1, No=0)	--	--	0.853	0.354
No. of Siblings on Husband's Side				
>=1 (Yes=1, No=0)	--	--	0.810	0.392

Note: For Model I and Model II, the dependent variable is fertility intention in 2010. Except for fertility intention in 2007, all the other independent variables use information from 2010 survey if available. Decision-making index, policy eligibility, and gender of the first child use information from 2007 survey.

For Model III, the dependent variable is intention transition from 2007 to 2010. Except for change of family income (per capita) from 2007 to 2010, all the other independent variables use information from 2007 survey.

Table 4. Multinomial Logistic Regression on 2010 Fertility Intention

	Maybe No More vs. Definitely No More		Uncertain vs. Definitely No More		Maybe One More vs. Definitely No More		Definitely One More vs. Definitely No More	
	Model I	Model II	Model I	Model II	Model I	Model II	Model I	Model II
Intercept	-0.703	-0.666	-0.270	-0.260	0.716	0.599	-2.159 *	-2.010
	(0.560)	(0.565)	(0.765)	(0.767)	(0.492)	(0.495)	(1.050)	(1.054)
2007 Intention								
Maybe No More	0.476 ***	0.476 ***	0.143	0.143	0.608 ***	0.610 ***	1.055 ***	1.053 ***
	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.228)	(0.228)
Not Certain	0.554 ***	0.553 ***	0.315	0.315	0.760 ***	0.760 ***	1.182 ***	1.182 ***
	(0.155)	(0.155)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.264)	(0.264)
Maybe One More	0.668 ***	0.668 ***	0.523 **	0.523 **	1.267 ***	1.268 ***	2.100 ***	2.098 ***
	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.172)	(0.172)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.172)	(0.172)
Definitely One More	0.547 *	0.547 *	0.680 *	0.679 *	1.171 ***	1.170 ***	3.001 ***	3.000 ***
	(0.225)	(0.225)	(0.304)	(0.304)	(0.169)	(0.170)	(0.211)	(0.212)
(Ref. Cat.=Definitely No More)								
Economic Resource								
Education								
Middle School	0.259	0.259	-0.077	-0.077	0.259 *	0.259 *	0.626	0.627
	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.188)	(0.188)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.340)	(0.341)
High School	0.265	0.266	0.030	0.033	0.426 **	0.421 **	0.574	0.584
	(0.160)	(0.160)	(0.217)	(0.217)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.373)	(0.373)
Some College and above	0.589 **	0.589 **	0.086	0.088	0.549 **	0.546 **	0.759	0.762
	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.273)	(0.273)	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.415)	(0.415)
(Ref. Cat.=No Educ and Elementary School)								
Occupation								
Agriculture	0.546 **	0.545 **	0.628 *	0.625 *	0.698 ***	0.704 ***	-0.043	-0.047
	(0.167)	(0.167)	(0.252)	(0.252)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.346)	(0.346)
Manufacture	0.147	0.147	0.298	0.296	0.037	0.038	-0.206	-0.205
	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.202)	(0.202)	(0.129)	(0.129)	(0.250)	(0.250)
Low-skilled Service	-0.063	-0.064	0.261	0.259	0.052	0.056	-0.138	-0.142
	(0.155)	(0.155)	(0.221)	(0.221)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.278)	(0.278)
High-skilled Service	-0.216	-0.216	-0.029	-0.031	0.055	0.057	-0.240	-0.238
	(0.172)	(0.172)	(0.245)	(0.245)	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.295)	(0.295)
(Ref. Cat.=No Job)								
Family Income (per capita)								
2nd Quartile	0.049	0.050	0.082	0.083	0.235 *	0.232 *	0.129	0.136
	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.213)	(0.213)
3rd Quartile	0.036	0.037	0.161	0.161	0.333 **	0.334 **	0.289	0.288
	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.224)	(0.224)
4th Quartile	0.304 **	0.305 **	0.137	0.137	0.612 ***	0.610 ***	0.775 ***	0.777 ***
	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.217)	(0.217)
(Ref. Cat.=1st Quartile)								
Hukou Status *(Rural=1, Other=0)*	-0.322 ***	-0.321 ***	0.097	0.098	0.271 **	0.266 **	-0.122	-0.119
	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.178)	(0.178)
Family/Social Resource								
Coresident with Parents/Parents-in-law	-0.492 ***	-0.492 ***	-0.256 *	-0.257 *	-0.265 ***	-0.264 ***	0.021	0.020
(Coresident=1, Non-coresident=0)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.151)	(0.151)
Parents/Parents-in-law Helped with Child Care	0.207 *	0.207 *	0.160	0.162	-0.190 *	-0.193 *	-0.035	-0.035
(Has Help=1, No Help=0)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.153)	(0.153)

Empowerment								
Decision-Making Index: Final Decision by Wife	-0.009	-0.050	-0.030	-0.047	-0.062 *	0.068	-0.019	-0.207
	(0.030)	(0.086)	(0.042)	(0.076)	(0.028)	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.169)
Control Variables								
Women's Age	-0.042 *	-0.043 *	-0.056 *	-0.056 *	-0.090 ***	-0.090 ***	-0.075 *	-0.075 *
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Migration Experience	-0.125	-0.126	-0.125	-0.126	0.135	0.139	0.112	0.104
(Has Experience=1, No Experience=0)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.148)	(0.148)
Policy Eligibility	-0.435 ***	-0.436 ***	0.404 **	0.404 **	-0.442 ***	-0.439 ***	-0.383	-0.387
(Allowed for 2 Kids=1, Allowed for only 1 kid=0)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.214)	(0.215)
Gender of the First Child	-0.100	-0.100	0.105	0.106	0.137 *	0.136 *	0.203	0.203
(Girl=1, Boy=0)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.135)	(0.135)
Age of the First Child	-0.013	-0.013	-0.060 *	-0.060 *	-0.063 ***	-0.063 ***	-0.073 *	-0.073 *
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Wife's No. of Sibling	0.133	0.092	-0.345 **	-0.369 *	0.300 **	0.449 ***	0.367	0.194
(One or More=1, Zero=0)	(0.121)	(0.145)	(0.126)	(0.146)	(0.099)	(0.119)	(0.203)	(0.242)
Husband's No. of Sibling	0.128	0.128	-0.386 **	-0.385 **	0.178	0.173	0.401 *	0.405 *
(One or More=1, Zero=0)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.128)	(0.127)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.201)	(0.201)
Interaction Effect								
Wife's No. of Sibling >=1 * Decision-Making Index		0.047		0.031		-0.163 *		0.219
		(0.092)		(0.091)		(0.068)		(0.180)
Chi²	1678.350	1687.170						
d.f.	100	104						
N	10,632	10,632						

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Note: For the dependent variable, fertility intention for second birth in 2010, the reference category is "definitely no more".

Figure 3. Predicted Probability of Fertility Intention for "Maybe One More Child"- the Interaction Effect



Table 5. Multinomial Logistic Regression On Intention Transition from 2007 to 2010

	Largely Decreased vs. Unchanged	Slightly Decreased vs. Unchanged	Slightly Increased vs. Unchanged	Largely Increased vs. Unchanged
Intercept	-0.466	-1.512 **	0.314	0.855 *
	(0.449)	(0.550)	(0.488)	(0.403)
Large Increase in Family Income (per capita)	0.077	0.044	0.158	0.205 *
(Largely Increased=1, Not Largely Increased=0)	(0.110)	(0.135)	(0.117)	(0.096)
Education				
Middle School	0.008	0.198	0.112	0.140
	(0.109)	(0.141)	(0.123)	(0.104)
High School	0.099	0.399 *	-0.116	0.243
	(0.135)	(0.170)	(0.154)	(0.126)
Some College and above	0.208	0.657 **	0.052	0.388 **
	(0.159)	(0.192)	(0.178)	(0.150)
(Ref. Cat.=No Educ and Elementary School)				
***Hukou* Status**	-0.193 *	-0.167	-0.298 **	0.256 **
(Rural=1, Other=0)	(0.081)	(0.098)	(0.087)	(0.076)
Women's Age	-0.039 *	-0.024 ***	-0.059 **	-0.066 ***
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.015)
Migration Experience	0.133	0.066	-0.047	-0.081
(Has Experience=1, No Experience=0)	(0.075)	(0.092)	(0.085)	(0.069)
Policy Eligibility	0.039	-0.302 **	-0.441 ***	-0.456 ***
(Allowed for 2 Kids=1, Allowed for only 1 kid=0)	(0.089)	(0.115)	(0.105)	(0.082)
Gender of the First Child	0.137 *	0.146	0.043	0.118
(Girl=1, Boy=0)	(0.067)	(0.081)	(0.074)	(0.061)
Age of the First Child	-0.010	-0.011	-0.018	-0.056 ***
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.014)
Chi^2	530.840			
d.f.	40			
N	10,632			

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Figure 4. Predicted Probability of Intention Transition based on the Variations of Changes of Family Income



Figure 4. Predicted Probability of Intention Transition based on the Variations of Changes of Family Income